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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
\L\.\H'l'IN W. KELLER and JOAN
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs .

Case No.
11834

.\L\XfNE PATRAKIS,

Drf r,ndant and Respondent.

APP·ELLANTS' BRIEF
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action by plaintiffs against the defendant
for dnmag·cs as a result of personal injuries and property
1lamagt> sustained by the plaintiffs as a result of an
nutornobilc accident.

DINPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The trial of the instant case was held on the 18th and
l!Jt!i dnys of June, 1969, in the District Court of Salt

Lake <'onnty Lefore the Honorable Marcellus K. Snow,
itl1 a .iur;'. On June 19, 1969, the jury returned a verdict
i;, L1n1r of defendant and against the plaintiffs for no
11

1

cause af action. Subsequently, the plaintiffs made ,
motion for a new trial, ·which motion was denied 01
August 18, 1969.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The plaintiffs seek to have the order of the lower
court denying plaintiffs' motion for a new trial reYersed
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This action arises out of an automobile accidP11
which occurred on October 28, 1967, at approximat1·h
1 :00 p.m. near the intersection of 21st East and Sunn:
side AYenue in Salt Lake City, Utah. (R. 105, 107) T!J1,
accident occurred when the automobile owned and
driven by plaintiff l\Iaartin vV. Keller and in which hi,
"'if e, plaintiff Joan Keller, was riding as a
was southbound on 2100 East and had stopped i11 th"
center lane of a three lane highway for a red light at
the intersection with Sunnyside A venue and was struck
from the rear by an automobile being driven by the defendant Maxine Patrakis which was also southbound 01
2100 East in the center lane of traffic. (R. 107)
1

1

On the day of the accident, it was raining moderatel1
and the roadways were wet. (R. 106) The defen<lmn
Patrakis was eighteen years of age at the tii11,
of the accident and was driYing her father's 1967 Chen 11
let automobile which had been purchased new approx 1·
mately three months prior to the collision. Prior to th
accident, Miss Patrakis had driven the car for approxi
1

2

11 ullei>

111 ,11;1';;

honrs in the ram and had noticed that the
011 t]1C' automobile would squeak and grab. (R. 115)
t\10

'l'li<' approach to the intersection of 2100 East and

!l11)·sidP ,\ n'nne is unobstructed for several hundred
11 I'! as is shown i11 photographs of the scene. (Ex. P-1)
.\J,o dt·fr11clant co11cedes that she could probably see the
;1111·r,,1·etio11 from further back tha11 one hundred fifty
frd. (H. 114)
:-; 11

l'pon approaching the intersection of 2100 East and
:-;1lll11yside Annue, the defendant testified she observed
1l1l' sC'rrwphore light being red approximately one hunrln·d fit't)· to two hundred feet prior to the intersection,
:rnd at this time, she was travelling at approximately
t11·<·11ty-fiw to thirty miles per hour. (R. 107) At a point
,r1111cwhat closer to the intersection which she estimates
ti1 ill' sennty-fin feet, she applied her brakes hard.
I It. 11:2)

Tlw tkfcndant claims that the brakes failed to give
iir·1 any reaction (R. 108) ; however, she concedes that

,J11• had slowed to approximately five miles per hour at
1IH· timl' of the impact. (R. 108) Also, she knew that the
11atl'r might have some effect on the brakes and that
tli1·>· had squeaked and grabbed on the day of the accident
l1(•<·ausp of moisture on them. (R. 115, 116)
Following the accident, the brakes were apparently
i11 11,.rf<>et condition, and the car was driven home by the
il 1·!'1·1Hlant who exhibited no concern for their failure.
'Ii. 118, 119) Also the defendant's father had the brakes

:i

on the automobile checked by a mechanic shortly follo 11
ing thL' accident, and they were found to be functioniu"
properly. (R. 130, 132)
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING THE ''BRAKE FAILURE'' INSTRUCTION AND IN FAILING TO GRANT PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR A NEvV TRIAL.
The plaintiffs' basic contention in support of their
motion for a new trial was that the court erred in giving
Instruction No. 9 which was requested by the defendant
and which is as follows:
''An automobile driver who has no notice of
f arulty brakes and could not discover the de feel

through the exercise of reasonable care is not
responsible for any damage caused by bral.i
failure.

If the driver knows or should know of such
a defect, however, and takes no precautionary
measures, he is liable for the consequence.'' (R
36) (Emphasis added)

The plaintiffs made a timely exception to this instruction. (R. 123, 125)

It is clear that there was no evidence of any "brah
failure" and to allow Instruction No. 9 relating to hrah
failure to be given to the jury gives the defendant an added advantage not warranted by the evidence and is extremely prejudicial to the plaintiffs. The facts of the ac·
cident indicate that the defendant simply failed to
adequately allo-w for the increased stopping distance re
4

'\uirPd

011

a wet road and in driving a car which had

pn•\ iously gi,·en some indication of haying moisture on

tlw hrnkPs whirh had affected their reaction. The defendnn! conc·Pdes that she was aware that moisture on the
\ 1r:1kes would aff eet their reaction, and her testimony is
;h

foll<nn;:

''Question: Now, had you had any difficulty
prior to that time with the brakes on your vehicle,
the day I'm talking about 1
Answer: Well, as I started out in the morning and as I progressed doing my errands, the
brakes would squeak and they would somewhat
grab ·when I applied them. (R. 109)

•

•

•

•

Question: Didn't you conclude from that that
the water might be having some effect on the
Answer : Yes.
Question: And on this occasion when you applied them you said they squeaked again T
Answer: Pardon me.
Question: Oh, this accident happened as it
was happening you said the brakes squealed when
you put them on but didn't stop you T
Answer: This is correct." (R. 116)
Following the accident, the defendant drove the .
:rntomohile two or three miles to her home, and her
Lith(·r had the brakes on the automobile tested by a
r1wehanie who found them to be functioning properly.
'l'hp plaintiffs do not dispute that the statement of
t 111' law SL•t forth in Instruction No. 9 is correct and this
j,
forth in the rase of White v. Piney, 99 Utah 484,

1U8 P.:2<l :249. However, there mw..;t be some evi<lenee 01
a defective con<li ti on in the brakes in order for such a11
instruction to be given, and to give the same to a jur1
whl're 110 evidence supporting a defective condition j,
iHtrodueed is clearly prejudicial. For cases settillg fortL
thl• rule that there must be some e\·idcnce to support"
theory of the ease before an iHstruction concerniug th,
same is warra11ted, see TVebb v. 811ow, 102 Utah 43::J, I:t
P.2d 114, and Hall v. Blackham, 18 Utah 2d 164, 41;
P.2d 664.
The Supreme Court of the State of W ashi11gto11,
when presented with the issue involved in the insta11'.
ease, ruled that it was improper to give a "brake failun···
instructicrn where there was no evidence of a lm1kP
failure. In the case of Woods v. Goodsen, 55 \Vash.2il
687, 349 P.2d, the defendant driver stated that she applied the brake pedal but the brakes failed to respond,
and she struck a truck which, in turn, struck the plaintifl
who was a pedestrian. The defendant claimed a hraki
failure clef ense, and the court gave two "brake failurr"
i11structio11s which were substantially the same as Instruction Nos. 9 and 10 given by the co mt in the instant
case. Expert witnesses were called \vho testified that th"
brakes were in proper operating condition when the m·- ,
cident occurred, and no evidence of a brake failure wa'
introduced. The experts further testified that in thei1
opinion, the alleged ''brake failure'' was due to th
fact that the motor was not running when the defenclalll
attempted to stop her automobile thus rendering it mor 1•
difficult to stop the automobile which was equipped witl:
1

6

[J1>\11·r !>rahs. In holding that it was prejudicial error to
1·1· tlw · · hrnkr' failure'' instruetions, the Supreme Court

"r \Ya.-;!ii11gto11 stated in part as follows:

'' Tlw respondent was charg0d with knowlP<lge that, when the motor was not running the
hrakes would not function.* * *An automobile can
])(' a dangerous instrumentality. The dri\·er thereof is, therefore, charged with knowledge of its
operational limitations.
*
*
*
*
* ' The giving of instructions Nos. 18 and 19
was not merited by the evidence. The instructions
were prejudicial because thereby the jury were
permitted to exculpate the respondent from liability, if they found she did not know that ·which
:-;he is charged in law with knowing." (349 P.2d at
p. 734)

(lthi>r eases supporting the rule set forth in the TVoods
('a:-;t.' an' Cdy of Miami v. Fletcher, 167 S.2d 638 (Fla.,
1
J IG.f), where the court held that a "brake failure" in,lrndion was properly not given where the driver knew
qf trnnhle with the brakes; Harnmonds u. Mansfield, 296
S.W. 2d G:52 ('I'enn.); and Savage r. Blancett, 198 N.E.
(111., 1964).
The law is clear the one who voluntarily operates a
motor \·eliiele on the public highways undertakes an adult
;idi1·it)· and the responsibilities which accompany the
'<llllt· and is bound to be aware of certain basic facts of
pl1.1 ,i1·al l'l'ie11ce such as the fact that the stopping dis:,1111·1· \\·ill increase on a wet roadway and when the brakes
"11 1111• a11tomol>ile are wet. The defendant was eighteen
1 1-;n,, of age at the time of the accident; however, the

7

siam1an1 of care is th0 same for any driver
of agP, sex, 0xperienc0 or mental or physical ability. Se 0
Biddle L Mazzocco, 204 Ore. 547, 248 P.2d 364. Also ser
.Jackiw11 r. Wilhelm, 102 P.2d 731, 106 Colo. 140, when'
thP court held that the d<>gr0e of care to be exercised by
a drin•r increases wh0n operating n motor vehicle on ai 1
iey roadway.

'1'110 d0fendant does not claim that the brakes on lwr
automobile were defective, and, in fact, introduced eYidence through her father which indicates that the car
was checked by a garage shortly following the accidrnt,
and the brakes wer0 found to he in perfect working order.
(R. 130)

'ro allow the ''brake failure'' instruction to be gin,11
is tantamount to giving an "unavoidable accident" instruction which is not warranted by the facts of the
and under applicable Utah law. In lVoodhouse 1'. Joh11so11, 20 Utah 2d 210, 436 P.2d 442, the Supreme Court of
the State of Utah stated in relation to an "unavoidabll'
aceident'' instruction that:
''Such an instruction should be given with
caution and only where the evidence would justify
it." (20 Utah 2d at p. 13)
'l'lw following exc<>rpt from the dissent by Justice Ellett
in the lVoodlwuse case accurately sets forth the dilemnrn
in which the plaintiff is placed by the giving of an i11
st ruction such as the '' hrakP failure'' instrnetion in thL·
instant case where therP was ahsolut<>ly no eYidenel' ot
<iny defoct in the braking system:

8

'' ' ••
Such an instruction givEs the defense
('OUJlS('l two arrows for his bow. He can discuss
tho O\'idenc<> 011 all phases of the case regarding
lack of evidence on the part of the defendant, then
he can draw another arrow from his legal quiver
and begin to talk about unavoidable accidents as
if that were something apart from negligence. "' "'
* It compels the plaintiff to assume the double
burden of convincing the jury, first that defendant was negligent and second that there was no
unavoidable accident. * "' "'
If the jury finds no negligence on the part of
the defendant, then there is no need for the instruction in the first place.''
In the instant case, the issue was clearly whether or
11ot thr defendant was negligent in operating her automobile under the facts and circumstances present at the
time of the collision and to allow a "brake failure" into be given was prejudicial to the plaintiffs.
The facts and circumstances existing at the time of the
<HTident were that the road was wet and that the water
!:ad ea used the brakes of the defendant's automobile to
"'1nc•ak and grab, and that the wet road coupled with the
wet brakes of the automobile materially affected its
-toppi11g distance.
In order for an "unavoidable accident" instruction
or a ''brake failure'' instruction to be given, there must
lie some e\'idenee to support the same such as in the case
of f>orfer v. Price, 11 Utah 2d 80, 355 P.2d 66. In that
"1sr, the defendant was seized with a severe insulin reaction which caused him to lose control of his automof,jJ(' arnl strike the plaintiff. The court held that the un1

9

an>idahle aeciclent instruction was proper where the erid011ee indicated that tlw insulin reaction was sudden alld
('OU!ll not have been foreseen and guarded against Ii>- th
dd'ernlai1t. This is c011t rasted to the instant case \\'li(•fr
defendant had driven a ear for (ffer hn> hours prior to
1tH' eollision and had obserncl that the brakes were hLeoming wd inasmueh as
had squeaked and grahht·d
.A ease similar to the instant ease except for tl11
"l1rake failure" instruction is Holmes I'. Nelson, 7 Utal1
+:33, :12G P.2d 722, \d1ere a nnliet of no cause of a('tion was returned in favor of defendant who hacl strn('k
a pedestrian. On appeal, the Court held that the
of the' motion for a new trial was proper based upon fact'
rernarkahly similar to those in the instant case as tli1._1
l'l'latc to the distance from the point where the impact
oecmTed to the point where the def enclant was fosl
aware of the need for a change in his course or speed or
t rn \'el. In the Holm es ease, the def enclant testifie(l that
he• o hserved the pe{lestrian a bout two h unllrecl feet from
the point of impact compared to one hundred fifty to (\111
hundred fc0t in the instant ease and at that time, remon'd his foot from the gas pedal as did the clefernla11:
in this case (R. 107, 108). In holding that the motion fr1r
a ne\\' trial was properly granted, tlw Court stafrd <1-

follows:
""\Ye are of the opm10n that this accide11t
never should have happened; it was preventahl1
A careful review of the e\·iclence leads us to tli1
conclusion that the defendant either did nut :-1·1·
this child when he said he dicl, or he \ms 110t g-oiw:
as slo\\·ly as he claims he waf', or that 110 foik<l t 11

10

do l'\·prything reasonably possible to avoid striking the plaintiff by bringing his car to a stop as
soon as possible or by turning to the right." (7
l!tah 2d at p. 438)

CONCLUSION
Ill c011elusion, it is respectfully submitted that the
trial ('Ourt rrrcd in giving the "brake failure" instruct io11 \Yh<'n' there was no rvidence that the brakes failed
''I' that thry were defective. The giving of such instruc-

was clearly prejudicial to the plaintiffs and was
1i111tamom1t to gi,·ing an "unavoidable accident" instruct i<1ll in a l'asc where the facts did not warrant the same.
The d0eision of the trial court denying plaintiffs' motion
for a iie\\· trial should be re,·ersed.
1io11

Respectfully submitted,

KIPP AND CHRISTIAN
CARMAN E. KIPP
.J. ANTHONY EYRE
520 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Attorneys for Plaintiffs and
AppellGJnts
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